Uncommon Monsters in Main Event Two, Episode Two

Michael Craig on Poker

Topics: Epic Poker League, September Main Event, Michael Craig on Poker, Isaac Baron, Adam Levy, Allen Bari, Dutch Boyd [+]

When you are out of position, calling a raise from the big blind, how do you play when you flop a huge hand? Too aggressive, and you get the raiser to fold; not aggressive enough, and you risk losing value. During Episode 2 of Epic’s second Main Event, this kind of situation came up several times. The players holding monsters took different approaches, showing the numerous ways of succeeding in a hand.

Note: In describing the strategies involved in the hands below, I reveal the outcome of the hands. None of them involve a player’s elimination.

With 15 remaining, the players began the 3,000-6,000/1,000 ante level. The chip average was 323,300, or about 54 big blinds. When the first hand took place, Jonathan Little had busted in fifteenth, so the chip average was slightly higher.

Isaac Baron v. Adam Levy

Adam Levy takes the non-aggressive approach. Against an opponent with a hand, he could have cost himself on the river. By inducing a bluff, however, he got to call a bet against an opponent who would have folded.

At the start of the hand, Isaac Baron had 462,000, one of the larger stacks. He raised UTG+1 to 13,000 with Qd-Jd. Adam Levy, in the small blind with a below-average stack of 167,000 and Ks-Js, called the additional 10,000.

With 39,000 in the pot, Levy got a perfect flop: Ad-Kh-Kc. He now had trip kings and there were no flush draws, two gut shot draws (Q-T or Q-J, which was Baron’s actual hand). Levy is behind only A-A, A-K, or K-Q. An even bigger worry for Adam, however, is that there are few hands Baron can have where he can get action. If Baron – another player who has repeatedly shown he can lay down quality cards – has pocket queens, he knows it’s a terrible flop. He needs Baron to have an ace.

Adam checks to the raiser, and Isaac also checks. Most players in Adam’s position would think, “Ugh, not even a continuation bet? Now I have to bet out the turn and hope he has an ace and will call along.”

Levy shows uncommon skill, holding back with his monster hand on the chance Barron doesn’t have an ace and will bluff, or in any case won’t let the pot go so easily. The turn is the useless three of spades, and Levy checks again. Baron bet 13,000, a small bet of just one-third the pot. Levy just calls.

After the seven of clubs on the river, Adam again checks the now-65,000 pot. Isaac bluffs at it again, betting 28,000. Adam calls and wins the 121,000 pot.

Allen Bari v. Dutch Boyd, parts 1 & 2

Allen Bari is, in addition to being highly skilled, is a very confident and logical player. He sometimes shares his thinking on a hand, either talking it through while contemplating a decision or giving his opponent or the table his opinion after. No one is correct all the time, but Bari gives the impression he’d put his average against other top players and, even when he’s incorrect, he is always thinking carefully.

On a pair of hands, Dutch Boyd made some unconventional moves. Allen couldn’t figure out their logic and, cut adrift from his methodical thinking, made some atypical mistakes. On the first hand, Bari raised Boyd’s big blind with Jc-6c. He made second pair on the Kh-6s-4c board, and Boyd called his bet. Dutch, with Qd-9s, clearly was “floating” Allen, figuring if he didn’t have a king, he would eventually give up his hand. (A hidden talent of Boyd in this situation, apart from playing unconventionally to Bari’s method of thinking, is determining that Allen didn’t have a king or a big pair. Those aren’t uncommon holdings from an under-the-gun raiser, even though Bari’s actual hand was Jc-6c.)

After check-calling the flop, Boyd bet out on the turn with the board reading Kh-6s-4c-8h. Taking over the betting lead in this circumstance – the move is sometimes called a “weak lead” – is a seldom-practiced play. Bari, with his pair, called. After a three on the river – if Allen’s hand was good on the turn, surely it would be good now – Dutch bet again and Allen, befuddled, folded. He asked Boyd to show a card and Dutch turned over a queen. Bari muttered, “weird line … king-queen?”

At the start of the 4,000-8,000/1,000 ante level, Allen Bari played 7-7 against a board with K-Q-A in a manner he would probably admit was very unusual. Without getting inside the heads of the players, it seems likely Dutch Boyd fiddled with Bari’s internal gyroscope.

Bari started the hand with 532,000, Boyd with 355,000. Once again, Bari raised UTG, making it 16,000 with 7s-7h. Boyd, again in the big blind, just called with Kd-Kc. With 43,000 in the pot, Dutch’s superior starting hand improved dramatically from a flop of Kh-Qd-3s.

Boyd’s situation was like Adam Levy’s against Isaac Baron: he was so far ahead that the challenge would be keeping from scaring off his opponent. He checked and, with 43,000 in the pot, Bari made a continuation bet of 14,000. Dutch made the simple play of strong-acting-strong. He check-raised, making it 42,000. Bari judged the likelihood that Boyd would play a strong hand this way so remote that he called. He put Boyd either on a complete bluff, or thought he could get Dutch to throw away a superior hand on a later street. (It’s likely if Allen thought this way that he wasn’t really off-base: Boyd could have made the check-raise with a lot of hands other than K-K, including ones he would have folded to later pressure.)

Now the pot totaled 127,000. The turn was the ace of hearts, a perfect card for Dutch, doubly so because Allen regarded it as useful. Boyd, who just check-raised, checked at the sight of an ace. The ace didn’t change the strength of his hand or Bari’s, but it gave Bari more reason to believe he could bluff. He bet 69,000, which Boyd called.

The pot now had 265,000, and the river was the two of hearts. That put three hearts on the board, along with the three cards to a big straight. Boyd checked, Bari made a big bluff, 190,000, and Boyd called. Dutch’s set of kings allowed him to pull in a massive pot, 645,000. Naturally, Allen Bari couldn’t know that Dutch had a hand too big to fold under any circumstances. It seems, though, that Boyd induced him to bluffing behavior of a level he would not otherwise attempt, and stick with it much longer than prudent.