Key Hands

When you are out of position, calling a raise from the big blind, how do you play when you flop a huge hand? Too aggressive, and you get the raiser to fold; not aggressive enough, and you risk losing value. During Episode 2 of Epic’s second Main Event, this kind of situation came up several times. The players holding monsters took different approaches, showing the numerous ways of succeeding in a hand.

Isaac Baron v. Adam Levy

Adam Levy takes the non-aggressive approach. Against an opponent with a hand, he could have cost himself on the river. By inducing a bluff, however, he got to call a bet against an opponent who would have folded.

At the start of the hand, Isaac Baron had 462,000, one of the larger stacks. He raised UTG+1 to 13,000 with Qd-Jd. Adam Levy, in the small blind with a below-average stack of 167,000 and Ks-Js, called the additional 10,000.

With 39,000 in the pot, Levy got a perfect flop: Ad-Kh-Kc. He now had trip kings and there were no flush draws, two gut shot draws (Q-T or Q-J, which was Baron’s actual hand). Levy is behind only A-A, A-K, or K-Q. An even bigger worry for Adam, however, is that there are few hands Baron can have where he can get action. If Baron – another player who has repeatedly shown he can lay down quality cards – has pocket queens, he knows it’s a terrible flop. He needs Baron to have an ace.

Adam checks to the raiser, and Isaac also checks. Most players in Adam’s position would think, “Ugh, not even a continuation bet? Now I have to bet out the turn and hope he has an ace and will call along.”

Levy shows uncommon skill, holding back with his monster hand on the chance Barron doesn’t have an ace and will bluff, or in any case won’t let the pot go so easily. The turn is the useless three of spades, and Levy checks again. Baron bet 13,000, a small bet of just one-third the pot. Levy just calls.

After the seven of clubs on the river, Adam again checks the now-65,000 pot. Isaac bluffs at it again, betting 28,000. Adam calls and wins the 121,000 pot.

Allen Bari v. Dutch Boyd, parts 1 & 2

Allen Bari is, in addition to being highly skilled, is a very confident and logical player. He sometimes shares his thinking on a hand, either talking it through while contemplating a decision or giving his opponent or the table his opinion after. No one is correct all the time, but Bari gives the impression he’d put his average against other top players and, even when he’s incorrect, he is always thinking carefully.

On a pair of hands, Dutch Boyd made some unconventional moves. Allen couldn’t figure out their logic and, cut adrift from his methodical thinking, made some atypical mistakes. On the first hand, Bari raised Boyd’s big blind with Jc-6c. He made second pair on the Kh-6s-4c board, and Boyd called his bet. Dutch, with Qd-9s, clearly was “floating” Allen, figuring if he didn’t have a king, he would eventually give up his hand. (A hidden talent of Boyd in this situation, apart from playing unconventionally to Bari’s method of thinking, is determining that Allen didn’t have a king or a big pair. Those aren’t uncommon holdings from an under-the-gun raiser, even though Bari’s actual hand was Jc-6c.)

After check-calling the flop, Boyd bet out on the turn with the board reading Kh-6s-4c-8h. Taking over the betting lead in this circumstance – the move is sometimes called a “weak lead” – is a seldom-practiced play. Bari, with his pair, called. After a three on the river – if Allen’s hand was good on the turn, surely it would be good now – Dutch bet again and Allen, befuddled, folded. He asked Boyd to show a card and Dutch turned over a queen. Bari muttered, “weird line … king-queen?”

At the start of the 4,000-8,000/1,000 ante level, Allen Bari played 7-7 against a board with K-Q-A in a manner he would probably admit was very unusual. Without getting inside the heads of the players, it seems likely Dutch Boyd fiddled with Bari’s internal gyroscope.

Bari started the hand with 532,000, Boyd with 355,000. Once again, Bari raised UTG, making it 16,000 with 7s-7h. Boyd, again in the big blind, just called with Kd-Kc. With 43,000 in the pot, Dutch’s superior starting hand improved dramatically from a flop of Kh-Qd-3s.

Boyd’s situation was like Adam Levy’s against Isaac Baron: he was so far ahead that the challenge would be keeping from scaring off his opponent. He checked and, with 43,000 in the pot, Bari made a continuation bet of 14,000. Dutch made the simple play of strong-acting-strong. He check-raised, making it 42,000. Bari judged the likelihood that Boyd would play a strong hand this way so remote that he called. He put Boyd either on a complete bluff, or thought he could get Dutch to throw away a superior hand on a later street. (It’s likely if Allen thought this way that he wasn’t really off-base: Boyd could have made the check-raise with a lot of hands other than K-K, including ones he would have folded to later pressure.)

Now the pot totaled 127,000. The turn was the ace of hearts, a perfect card for Dutch, doubly so because Allen regarded it as useful. Boyd, who just check-raised, checked at the sight of an ace. The ace didn’t change the strength of his hand or Bari’s, but it gave Bari more reason to believe he could bluff. He bet 69,000, which Boyd called.

The pot now had 265,000, and the river was the two of hearts. That put three hearts on the board, along with the three cards to a big straight. Boyd checked, Bari made a big bluff, 190,000, and Boyd called. Dutch’s set of kings allowed him to pull in a massive pot, 645,000. Naturally, Allen Bari couldn’t know that Dutch had a hand too big to fold under any circumstances. It seems, though, that Boyd induced him to bluffing behavior of a level he would not otherwise attempt, and stick with it much longer than prudent.

The three broadcasts from Epic’s first Main Event and last week’s broadcast from Main Event 2 featured numerous hands where pros threw away quality after hitting the flop because they correctly recognized their good hands were only second-best. Likewise, as with the huge call Erik Seidel made with a weak hand against a stone-bluff by Chino Rheem demonstrated how the best players sometimes have to call with very little.

Of course, even the best players aren’t right 100% of the time. Episode 2 of Main Event 2 presented at least three examples where world-class players had to make tough – and ultimately incorrect – calls. These hands show (a) the best players in the world are human and, perhaps more important, (b) there is a skill in inducing players to make calls with the second-best hand, and make those calls for the most possible chips. Watch some examples of great bet-sizing to squeeze out value.

With 15 remaining, the players began the 3,000-6,000/1,000 ante level. The chip average was 323,300, or about 54 big blinds.

Allen Bari v. Tim West

Tim West gets caught in a situation familiar with players at all skill levels: he has an ace, flops an ace, and has an opponent betting at him. Is his pair of aces good? How good is his kicker? As this hand shows, even great players can get stuck on an inferior ace. Tim West has made tougher laydowns, and it’s clear by the end that he’s not thrilled about calling. Note Allen Bari’s bet sizing. He probably gets the maximum value, including a gutsy big bet on the river when, if there was a chance for West to conclude his ten-kicker wasn’t good, that would have been it.

Before the hand, Allen Bari started with 340,000. West had 257,000. Allen, UTG+1 made the minimum raise to 12,000 with Ad-Kd. Tim West, in the big blind, called the additional 6,000 with As-Td.

The flop was great for Bari: 4s-Ah-Ks. He hit the ace, of course, but now any doubt that West could pass him with a lesser ace by pairing his kicker was dispelled. The best Allen could hope for was that Tim hit an ace or a king from the big blind, preferably an ace.

With 35,000 in the pot, West checked and Bari bet 11,000. The bet was small enough that West would call if he had an ace or king.

The turn card was the seven of hearts. With 57,000 in the pot, West checked and Bari bet 34,000. Note this is a higher percentage of the pot than the flop bet. With just one card to come Allen wants to punish Tim if he’s drawing to a spade flush and also see if Tim’s got an ace. By this time, if Tim has a king, he’s likely to give up. When Tim calls, that challenges Allen to see HOW MUCH Tim will call on the river with an inferior ace.

The river card was the six of spades. Technically, it makes a spade-flush possible but Bari has discounted that. After West checked, Bari made a huge bet relative to the pot size (93,000, with 125,000 already in the pot). This is a bold bet, even though Bari has corrected figured that West has an ace. It’s the right move, because West reluctantly calls, but Allen had to know his opponent extremely well, or be extremely aggressive, or both.

Tim West was crippled by the outcome, losing half his stack on the river bet. He goes from 257,000 to 96,000.

Mike McDonald v. Mike Watson

How do you lay down a hand? That is a recurring theme in this episode. Mike Watson, like Tim West, has shown an ability to throw away good cards even after connecting on a flop. But Watson, like West, gets stuck this time.

At the start of the hand (still at the 3,000-6,000/1,000 ante level), Watson had 341,000, McDonald 285. Watson, UTG+2, raised with Ah-Th to 14,000. McDonald, with Js-Jc, reraised to 34,000. Watson called. There was 84,000 in the pot preflop.

The flop was Tc-6d-4s. Mike Watson’s A-T had made him top-pair/top-kicker but Mike McDonald’s J-J gave him an overpair.

After Watson checked, McDonald bet 32,000. Watson raised to 77,000, McDonald reraised to 127,000 (half his remaining stack). Watson moved all-in and McDonald, reluctantly, called. When Watson failed to improve on the turn or river, Watson was left with just 70,000. The hand put McDonald in second chip position.

Sean Getzwiller v. David Steicke

Getzwiller and Steicke were among the lesser-known players making it to Day 3. Both proved worthy of their past accomplishments. Sean won his seat in the Pro/Am, for the second consecutive time. Still relatively new to live tournament poker, he also won a bracelet at the 2011 World Series of Poker. David traveled the furthest distance for the tournament, from Honk Kong, where he trades commodities and has occasionally, since 2007, played High Roller and other events, earning over $2 million. Predictably, he is fearless with his chips.

With the blinds at 5,000-10,000, Getzwiller, playing tight all day, raised to 28,000 under-the-gun with As-Qh. He started the hand with 326,000. Steicke, around the chip lead with nearly 900,000, flat-called on the button with a weak hand, Tc-8h. Steicke saw almost twice as many flops as Getzwiller, and with a big stack position, he could try to leverage small calls to win big pots or put pressure on shorter-stacked opponents as the hand progresses.

David hit a perfect flop, T-T-3. Not only didn’t Sean bite, but he asked if Steicke hit the “kitchen sink.” As they joked around through five checks (and Steicke further improved to a full house with an eight on the turn), David finally tried to wring one bet out of Getzwiller on the river. Everything about Sean Getzwiller suggests that he’s wise to Steicke. He sniffed out the situation beautifully, but then he didn’t trust his read and called 45,000, bet into the 75,000 pot. 

Jaime Kaplan v. Erik Seidel

Seidel and Kaplan both entered the day with above-average chances of making the money and perhaps survive to the final table. Erik Seidel? Not only because he’s Seidel but because he began the day 3rd in chips, 88 big blinds worth. It would take a calamity to bust him early.

Jaime Kaplan, who won his seat in the Pro/Am, had an impressive online tournament record, started 9th in chips with 61 big blinds. He had Seidel to his left, normally a disadvantage but possibly a continuous reminder to be patient and not force the action. Kaplan wasn’t inexperienced – it’s arguable he has played more hands of poker in his like than Seidel (including online) but he hadn’t played many in $20,000 events, against this caliber of opponent. Erik may have seemed like a vulture on Jaime’s left shoulder but at least the vulture would keep him from getting careless.

Unfortunately, early in the day, they got all their chips in on a calamitous hand where each player had ample reason to believe his hand was nearly unbeatable. At the start of the hand, during the 2,000-4,000/500 ante level, Kaplan had 209,000, and Seidel 375,500.

Chino Rheem v. Tim West

Chino, the Event 1 Champion, returned to Moving Day. Although he started 18th in chips, the structure allowed him some play with 34 big blinds. No one doubted he was going to put those chips to work in inventive ways. He already tangled with Seidel in an early hand. (Seidel, calling Rheem’s raise said, “for old-time sake”.) Tim West, an online superstar who was on fire during Spring 2011, like Chino got roughed up in the early action. They began his particular hand close in chips. Rheem, in the big blind, had 81,500. West, who started the day with 214,000, had 94,000. Under the gun, Tim raised to 10,000.

The hand demonstrates the flip-side of playing big hands (or all hands) aggressively. At the end of the hand, the loser asked, “Why can’t you bet the flop and save me 11k?” The winner responded, “Because I want 11k.” Each player then corrected figured out the other’s hand.

Mike McDonald v. Erik Seidel

This is a great match up between McDonald, the youngest player in the League, and Seidel, the most accomplished player in the League. Both players command respect but also radiate joy in their work – McDonald, showing great perspective about all he has accomplished, and Seidel, with his wry sense of humor.

For all the great hands Matt Savage’s and Annie Duke’s structure encourages by promoting skillful play throughout the hands, this hand is a dramatic show of brute force as each player tries to impose his will on the other. Seidel starts the hand with 579,000, McDonald with 268,000 – both have chipped up significantly since the start of the day. Mike, two to Erik’s left, has position most of the time, but not on this hand where Seidel raises on the button with McDonald in the big blind.

When you watch this hand, ask yourself the following questions: (1) Is either player getting a “read” on the other? (2) To what extent are the players playing the quality of their cards vs. everything else (relative position, chip stacks, risk tolerance)? (3) Once a player is all-in and is called, obviously it then becomes all about the cards. Because that’s the case, however, in the game of chicken before that time, is it a strategic advantage or disadvantage to be the player who moves all-in?

David Steicke v. Mike Watson

David Steicke started the day near the chip lead and built from there. At the start of the 2,500-5,000/500 level, the Hong Kong commodities trader with an incredible record in High Roller events had 682,000. Mike Watson is a 27-year-old Canadian pro who shares with Mike McDonald not just pronunciation of the word “sorry” – watch the broadcast, you’ll get the joke – but great success as a high-stakes online player, a major title in an event where he was one of the youngest competitors, and a serious attitude at odds with the stereotype of younger pros as reflexively overaggressive. Watson started the day 14th with 175,000 but built that to 463,000 when he tangled with Steicke.

David plays more hands than most players. He is less aggressive than most before the flop and becomes more active later in the hand. When his style of play works, the following happen: (a) he effectively leverages his big stack by betting players out of hands because he can better afford to take risks, and (b) he gets action when he makes a big hand and wins bigger pots.

This hand could have cost the loser MUCH more than it did. Watch how the player who loses this hand controls the pot (smaller) when he has the lead and is vulnerable, and how he folds a quality hand when he accurately determines he is now behind.

Matt Glantz v. Erik Seidel v. David Steicke

Steicke, the chip leader, gets into a hand with Matt Glantz and Erik Seidel. Steicke finds himself in a dream situation: his pair of deuces has turned into a monster on the flop and he has TWO players betting into him.

Again, this hand is interesting in how the losers limit their losses. One of the losers in the hand also engages in a classic bit of “coffeehousing” when folds his hand, correctly guesses the winner’s cards, and gets the winner to reveal them.